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COMMENT: ALTERNATIVE CRIMINAL
PENALTIES FOR WILFULLY FILING A
FALSE INCOME TAX RETURN
Jacob Kossman t
A seldom invoked principle of law has recently arisen, namely,
that where identical offenses are punishable under two different
statutes, the one carrying the lesser penalty governs.
In Berra v. United States' the Supreme Court held that, in a
prosecution under section 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 2 for wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes by filing
false and fraudulent returns, it was not error to refuse to instruct the
jury, under rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
that a verdict of guilty of the "lesser crime" under section 3616(a) 1
of the same Internal Revenue Code would be permissible, for the
reason that the latter was not a lesser included offense. The Court said:
"For here the method of evasion charged was the filing of a
false return, and it is apparent that the facts necessary to prove
that petitioner 'willfully' attempted to evade taxes by filing a
false return (§ 145(b)) were identical with those required to
prove that he delivered a false return with 'intent' to evade taxes
(' 3616(a)). In this instance §§ 145(b) and 3616(a) covered
precisely the same ground." 4
t Member, Philadelphia Bar.
1. 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
2. INT. RAV. COD4 Ol 1939, § 145(b) provided in part that: "Any person . . .who
wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty
of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
3. Id. § 3616(a) provided in part that any person who "delivers or discloses to the
collector or deputy any false or fraudulent . . .return ... with intent to defeat
or evade the . . . assessment intended to be made . . . shall be fined not exceeding
$1,000, or be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court,
with costs of prosecution."
The Berra case arose under the Internal Revenue Act of 1939. The sections in-
volved have been changed in the 1954 Act. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 7201, 7207. Sig-
nificantly, as Justice Harlan noted, 351 U.S. at 132, § 7207 no longer requires the ele-
ment of an attempt "to defeat or evade" taxes, as was so under the former § 3616(a).
Therefore, in all income tax cases that do not arise under the 1954 Act, where the
statute of limitations has not run, the Government will probably if wise, now charge
in its indictments affirmative acts such as "preparing" or "concealing," et cetera, and
not simply "filing."
4. 351 U.S. at 134.
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And further:
"Here, whether § 145 (b) or § 3616 (a) be deemed to govern, the
factual issues to be submitted to the jury were the same; the
instruction requested by petitioner would not have added any
other such issue for the jury's determination. When the jury
resolved those issues against petitioner, its function was exhausted,
since there is here no statutory provision giving to the jury the
right to determine the punishment to be imposed after the determin-
ation of guilt. Whatever other questions might have been raised as
to the validity of petitioner's conviction and sentence, because of the
assumed overlapping of §§ 145(b) and 3616(a), were questions
of law for the court. No such questions are presented here." '
Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined in a dissenting
opinion, stated:
"The Government admits here and the Court assumes that
filing a false and fraudulent income tax return is both a mis-
demeanor under 3616(a) and a felony under § 145(b). The
Government argues that the action of the trial judge must be
upheld because 'the Government may choose to invoke either
applicable law,' and 'the prosecution may be for a felony even
though the Government could have elected to prosecute for a
misdemeanor.' Election by the Government of course means
election by a prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General. I
object to any such interpretation of §§ 145 and 3616. I think we
should construe these sections so as not to place control over the
liberty of citizens in the unreviewable discretion of one individual
-a result which seems to me to be wholly incompatible with our
system of justice. Since Congress has specifically made the
conduct charged in the indictment a misdemeanor, I would not
permit prosecution for a felony under the broad language of
§ 145 (b). Criminal statutes, which forfeit life, liberty or property,
should be construed narrowly, not broadly." 8
The majority of the Court did not consider the correctness of
the sentence because it simply was never challenged. But it is clear
that if the Government elects to charge a defendant with attempting
to evade taxes by filing a false and fraudulent return, under such
circumstances, sections 3616 (a) and 145(b) cover the same ground '
and the defendant may be sentenced 8 only on section 3616(a). There
is no contention that either of the two sections involved impliedly
5. Id. at 134-35.
6. Id. at 138.
7. The Government admitted in its brief in the Berra case that "the filing of
a false and fraudulent return with intent to evade tax is also made a misdemeanor
by Section 3616(a) ; and the section clearly applies to all federal tax returns, including
income tax." Brief for Appellees, p. 23, Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
8. The trial court on its own motion reduced Berra's sentence from four years
imprisonment to two years.
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repeals the other.' The mention of 145(b) in the indictment is, of
course, of no significance."0
Furthermore, where the same subject matter is covered both by
a general and special statute, the terms of the latter prevail' As
Justice Van Devanter said in Washington v. Miller: 12
"In these circumstances we think there was no implied repeal,
and for these reasons: First, such repeals are not favored, and
usually occur only where there is such an irreconcilable conflict
between an earlier and a later statute that effect reasonably cannot
be given to both .. . ; second, where there are two statutes
upon the same subject, the earlier being special and the later
general, the presumption is, in the absence of an express repeal, or
an absolute incompatibility, that the special is intended to remain
in force as an exception to the general . . . ; and, third, there
was in this instance no irreconcilable conflict or absolute incom-
patibility, for both statutes could be given reasonable operation if
the presumption just named were recognized." "
In the present context this rule means that where a statute of general
application prescribes a particular penalty, and a statute of special
application prescribes a lesser penalty, the latter prevails.
Thus, in Robinson v. United States,'4 the defendant had been
convicted of larceny of money that was a part of the postal revenues.
9. Cf. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
10. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229 (1941); Williams v. United
States, 168 U.S. 382, 389 (1897); United States v. Albanese, 224 F.2d 879, 881 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 845 (1955) ; FED. R. CRim. P. 7c. If there were an omis-
sion or error in the citation of the statute invoked, obviously this would not be a
ground for dismissal, since the indictment alone apprises the defendant of the charge.
Therefore, the mere citation of § 145(b) alone is no authority for a sentence under
§ 145(b) where the charge in the indictment charges an offense punishable equally
under § 145(b) or § 3616(a).
In its brief filed in Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956), the Government
acknowledged that there was a fundamental distinction in an indictment charging an
"attempt" by acts other than filing and one simply charging filing, stating: "Further,
under the allegations of the first indictment in the Southern District the Government
was required to prove affirmative acts of evasion independent of and in addition to
proof that petitioner had wilfully filed a false income tax return at Austin. It is true,
as the United States Attorney stated to Judge Kennerly, that the same witnesses would
be used in proving the case under either indictment; but the extent of their testimony
and the manner of their testifying and the quality of their evidence might not be of
critical importance under the simpler proof involved in the second indictment." Brief
for Appellees, p. 74, Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
11. Clearly, the specific charge of filing a false return, which is spelled out en
haec verba, § 3616(a), prevails over the general denunciation of attempting to evade
taxes prescribed by § 145(b), wherein the filing of a false return is only one of the
"attempts in any manner" and then not as a matter of specific statutory prohibition
but by judicial interpretation, for the actual act of filing is not even an essential ele-
ment of the offense under § 145(b), United States v. Albanese, supra note 10, at 881.
In United States v. Demos, 291 Fed. 104 (S.D. Fla. 1923), the court expressed doubt
whether Congress ever intended that the offense of evading or defeating an income
tax established in an internal revenue act should cover the making of a false and
fraudulent return, since that act was already punished under a prior statute.
12. 235 U.S. 422 (1914).
13. rd. at 428.
14. 142 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944).
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This was a special offense for which section 190 of the former Criminal
Code prescribed a maximum sentence of not more than three years.
But the punishment for stealing property of the United States generally
was ten years, under section 46 of the Criminal Code. The court held
that only the lesser punishment could be imposed, citing many federal
cases, and saying:
"Elementally, the special stands against the general. That
is, where there is a law against any stealing, and another and
different law against stealing some particular thing, the two laws
do not invalidate each other by conflict, but the courts treat the
law against stealing the particular thing as presenting an excep-
tion to the law against stealing things in general. They enforce
the exception.
"... . .This rule is particularly applicable to criminal
statutes in which the specific provisions relating to particular
subjects carry smaller penalties than the general provisions." 15
In Bell v. United States "o the Court stated:
"When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of lenity. And this not out of any sentimental consid-
eration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in
prescribing evil or anti-social conduct. It may fairly be said to
be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforce-
ment of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher
punishment." "
Since the identical offense is punishable under two different
statutes, the one carrying the lesser penalty governs. 8 If there is
any ambiguity, the principle construing statutes in pari materia applies.
And it is elementary that statutes that prescribe punishment for the
same offense must be construed together, and if there is any doubt as
to which penal clause is applicable, the defendant is entitled to the
lesser penalty.
The Government's main contention in the Berra case, that "the
Government may choose to invoke either applicable law," section
145 (b) or section 3616(a), and "the prosecution may be for a felony
15. Id. at 432.
16. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
17. Id. at 83.
18. In United States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1956), the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, on August 15, 1956, ignored this principle and remarked simply
that ". . . each section requires an element of proof not required by the other." Id. at
363. This, however, disregards the dominant fact that the charge in the indictment-
the filing of a false and fraudulent return-does not require different elements of
proof. As the Supreme Court stated in the Berra case: "In this instance §§ 145(b)
and 3616(a) cover precisely the same ground." 351 U.S. at 134.
The Moran decision was questioned five days later by Judge Jerome Frank in
United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corporation, 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
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even though the Government could have elected to prosecute for a
misdemeanor," is surely not equal justice under the law. While the
Constitution does not require that a law should affect all persons
exactly alike, there is a guarantee of like treatment to all persons
similarly situated.
If a defendant can be indicted on the same state of facts for
either a felony or a misdemeanor, it would follow that a grand jury
or the United States Attorney, or both together, would have un-
controlled power to say how a person filing a false income tax return
shall be prosecuted and punished.
In the Berra case Justice Black, in his opinion concurred in by
Justice Douglas, said in this respect:
"A basic principle of our criminal law is that the Government
only prosecutes people for crimes under statutes passed by
Congress which fairly and clearly define the conduct made
criminal and the punishment which can be administered. This
basic principle is flouted if either of these statutes can be selected
as the controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney or
the Attorney General." "0
The line is not drawn according to the amount of unreported
tax or on the basis of whether the surrounding circumstances indicate
matter in aggravation or in mitigation. The prosecutor and the grand
jury would be permitted to determine the gravity of criminal charges
and consequent punishment solely upon the basis of whim, caprice or
upon their estimate of a defendant's social desirability as an individual.
Any such delegation of power would, it is submitted, be plainly uncon-
stitutional. Justice Black expressed this concept in the Berra case as
follows:
"A congressional delegation of such vast power to the
prosecuting department would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions. Of course it is true that under our system Congress may
vest the judge and jury with broad power to say how much
punishment shall be imposed for a particular offense. But it is
quite different to vest such powers in a prosecuting attorney. A
judge and jury act under procedural rules carefully prescribed
to protect the liberty of the individual. Their judgments and
verdicts are reached after a public trial in which a defendant has
the right to be represented by an attorney. No such protections
are thrown around decisions by a prosecuting attorney. Substi-
tution of the prosecutor's caprice for the adjudicatory process is
an action I am not willing to atribute to Congress in the absence
of clear command. Our system of justice rests on the conception
of impersonality in the criminal law." 20
19. 351 U.S. at 139 (dissent).
20. Id. at 140.
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Whatever justification there may be for imposing more severe
penalties for the same offense on persons who previously have been
convicted of crime,21 no justification can be found for giving power
to prosecutors to make a selection among defendants in criminal cases
based on no standards defined by law.
In two recent, well-reasoned cases in the Supreme Court of
Oregon, such delegation of power, even though specifically provided
for by statute, was held unconstitutional. In State v. Pirkey, an
Oregon statute delegated to the grand jury or to the committing
magistrate power to determine in advance whether to charge a
defendant with felony or misdemeanor for issuing a check with in-
sufficient funds in the bank with which to pay such check. No
standards for the exercise of the discretion conferred were set forth
in the statute.
The Supreme Court of Oregon held the measure unconstitutional,
saying:
"It would be monstrous to uphold and enforce a statute
which authorized a grand jury or magistrate to determine finally
whether an accused should receive a fine or a jail sentence, on
the one hand, or a penitentiary sentence, on the other, and to
make that decision before trial, without having heard any evidence
from the defendant, either on the issue of guilt or of mitigation,
and on the sole basis of a prima facie case made against one still
presumed to be innocent . . .. We see in this statute no
provision whereby one charged with a misdemeanor could be
sentenced as for a felony, however heinous the offense might after
trial appear to have been. Again, if the defendant is proceeded
against as for and convicted of a felony, there is no provision
authorizing the court in its informed discretion to impose punish-
ment as for a misdemeanor, however strong the evidence in
mitigation might be. In our opinion, such a statute so construed
would not only violate the Equal Protection Clause and constitute
an unauthorized delegation of discretionary power, but it would
constitute an invalid encroachment upon the function of the courts
whose prerogative and duty it is to determine, not only guilt, but
punishment, upon judicial inquiry, after public trial and within
the maximum and minimum limitations prescribed by the legis-
lature." '
Furthermore, the court continued:
"It might be said that this statute classifies punishments but
does not classify the circumstances to which the diverse punish-
21. In this regard, see Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
22. 203 Ore. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955).
23. Id. at 706, 281 P.2d at 702-03.
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ments are to be applied. This is not legal classification. It is
legal chaos." 24
And in State v. Cory,21 the same court struck down a similar
statute for the same reason.
The foregoing two decisions construed the equal protecti6n clause
of the fourteenth amendment, which of course binds only the states.
But the same concept of unjustifiable discrimination offends equally
against the due process clause of the fifth amendment that is operative
against the United States.28
Consequently, by parity of reasoning, any such unbridled discretion
in a United States Attorney and a federal grand jury to determine
whether the precise act shall be deemed a felony under section 145 (b)
or a misdemeanor under section 3616(a) would offend against due
process of law.
However, the constitutional issue is avoided by application of the
well-settled rule first discussed herein, namely, that where the same
offense is covered both by a general and specific statute, and no different
proof is required, the terms of the specific prevail, particularly where
the punishment is less.
The constitutional problem posed by the unlimited and uncanalized
discretion lodged in the prosecutor and the accusatory body to determine
whether an identical act shall be deemed felony or misdemeanor none-
theless requires that where an indictment charges an offense that is
punishable either as a felony or a misdemeanor, it must be considered
a misdemeanor only; the specific offense denounced by section 3616(a)
prevails over the catalogue of offenses 2 that falls within the ambit
of section 145 (b).
It is no answer that the Government might have spelled out
affirmative acts other than "filing." 28 "The rule that a man should
not be charged with one crime and convicted of another" was long
ago applied in Chief Justice Marshall's time. 9 The Supreme Court
did not reject this principle in the Berra case. It merely postponed
its application.
This much is certain, today the constitutional guarantees con-
trolling administration of criminal punishment retain an effectiveness
commensurate with their fundamental importance.
24. Id. at 705, 281 P.2d at 702.
25. 204 Ore. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955).
26. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
27. Cf. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
28. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
29. Schooner Hoppet v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 389, 394 (1813).
